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UNMARRIED COUPLES AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT: FROM STATUS TO 
CONTRACT AND BACK AGAIN? 
Robert C. Casad* 
DEAR ABBY: Who should pay for what in a live-in type 
relationship? 
-THE FEMALE 
DEAR FEMALE: In any kind of relationship, the assets, liabili-
ties and responsibilities should be shared 50-50 .... You might 
consider living with this free-loading, well-to-do creep just long 
enough to confirm a common law status (under recent court deci-
sion), and then sock it to him! 1 
In recent years, litigation over property arrangements be-
tween unmarried cohabitants has posed some old questions in a 
new light and has yielded some new answers. One of the most 
intriguing of these questions is whether a cohabitant has a right, 
upon dissolution of the relationship, to remuneration for house-
hold services rendered during the relationship. A spouse who con-
tributed household services in an actual marriage, of course, may 
upon divorce receive a share of the property acquired by the other 
spouse during the marriage or may receive a monetary award as 
compensation for the contributions made to the other during the 
marriage. These are established rights of the marital status. 
Unmarried cohabitants, however, traditionally have had no such 
rights. The "status" of "concubinage" or meretricious cohabita-
tion afforded neither party any recovery for services rendered to 
the other, unless the party seeking recovery was induced to pro-
vide services by a mistaken belief that the couple was validly 
married (the situation commonly referred to as "putative mar-
riage") or by duress.2 Recovery has generally been denied under 
quasi-contract or constructive-trust theories, since courts have 
reasoned that the law will not aid a wrongdoer in an illicit rela-
• Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1950, M.A. 1952, University of 
Kansas; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan; S.J.D. 1979, Harvard University.-Ed. 
1. Topeka Capital, Sept. 27, 1978, § 1, at 15, col. 4. 
2. In some 13 states and the District of Columbia, the institution of common-law 
marriage is still in force. If the relationship qualifies as a common-law marriage in those 
states, the parties have, upon dissolution, the same rights as parties to a formal, ceremo-
nial marriage. See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, CASES AND PROBLEMS 67 (1974). 
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tionship such as nonmarital cohabitation3 or that a donative in-
tent motivated the services and thus justified the retention of any 
benefit deriving from them. 4 Even when couples foresightedly 
dealt with the problem by an express contract, courts often found 
such contracts, which rested in part on an illegal consideration, 
unenforceable. 5 The "taint" of the meretricious association 
thwarted virtually all attempts to recover for services-some-
times even for nondomestic services. 6 
As the force of the social stigma on "concubinage" or 
"meretricious" relationships abates, however, more unmarried 
couples cohabit. 7 And as the number of cohabitants increases, 
pressure mounts to ascribe to their relationships certain 
marriage-like incidents to protect cohabitants from hardship and 
injustice when death or renunciation separates them. Courts in 
some states have responded by· expressly rejecting the "taint" 
doctrine. 8 As the state's interest in condemning immorality 
wanes, the way clears for doctrines better designed to accommo-
date the cohabitants' interests equitably. With "taint" rendered 
legally insignificant, the law's concern with unmarried cohabita-
tion generally should be, as with other consensual transfers of 
economic value, to protect the parties' reasonable expectations. 
3. See, e.g., Sackstaeder v. Kast, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1304, 105 S.W. 435 (1907); Simpson 
v. Normand, 51 La. Ann. 1355, 26 So. 266 (1899); Brown v. Tuttle, 80 Me. 162, 13 A. 583 
(1888). 
4. E.g., Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599,602,213 P.2d 727,729 (1950); 
In re Estate of Louis Klemow, 411 Pa. 136, 141, 191 A.2d 365,368 (1963); Willis v. Willie, 
48 Wyo. 403, 438, 49 P.2d 670, 681 (1935). 
5. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moriarty, 31 App. Div. 484, 492, 52 N.Y.S. 519, 522-23 (1898). 
Cf. Brown v. Tuttle, 80 Me. 162, 165, 13 A. 583, 584 (1888) (court would not enforce even 
an express contract, had one been made, that furthered an illegal relationship); Traver v. 
Naylor, 126 Or. 193, 207, 268 P. 75, 79 (1928) (future cohabitation cannot serve as any 
part of the consideration for a promise). 
6. See, e.g., Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1968); Willis v. Willis, 
48 Wyo. 403, 438, 49 P.2d 670, 681 (1935). 
7. The Bureau of the Census reported that the number of persons sharing living 
quarters with an unrelated member of the opposite sex virtually doubled between 1970 
and 1977, although the data included resident employees and roomers as well as persona 
living in a sexually companionate relationship. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 306, MARITAL STATUS AND 
LMNG ARRANGEMENTS, MARCH 1976, at 4 (1977). These and other data from the report are 
discussed in Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAIJF. L. REv. 
937, 975 (1977). See also Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts 
on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 101 n.1 (1976). 
8. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); 
Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.WJ!d 595 (1973); Carlson v. Olson,_ 
Minn.-, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978); Latham 
v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976). But see Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 
S.E.2d 81 (1977); Keller v. Keller, 220 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 1969). 
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Some couples, of course, will draft agreements expressing 
their understanding of and expectations about exchanges of eco-
nomic value in their relatipnship. If a couple has agreed how to 
govern the property aspects of their relationship and how to dis-
pose of their property when the relationship ends, the law ought 
to help carry out that agreement unless doing so would contra-
vene rules that invalidate similar consensual arrangements be-
tween non-cohabitants. If "taint" does not invalidate them, ex-
press trust or contract agreements could solve most of the prob-
lems of allocating property interests upon the termination of a 
relationship and could, in particular, provide some economic 
return to a party who works in the home. 
However, most couples do not consider the economics of their 
relationship paramount when their relationship begins. In fact, 
many fear that even mentioning such mundane matters would 
debase other, more important, non-economic aspects of their as-
sociation. Accordingly, cohabitants rarely make comprehensive, 
express written agreements ordering their economic relations. 
And while a court should honor express oral agreements too, their 
existence and contents will usually be difficult to prove, and the 
Statute of Frauds and the Dead Man's Statute will sometimes be 
insurmountable barriers to enforcing them. 
A court might, of course, infer an agreement, but inference 
can be an unreliable mechanism for ordering th~ economic rela-
tions of unmarried couples. Parties to a standardized commercial 
transaction or property transfer can establish implied-in-fact ar-
rangements-contracts or trusts-rather easily, because a normal 
expectancy can be imputed to those who do commercial things 
in a commercial setting, even though no words pass between 
them. But no one has yet articulated the standard expectations 
of unmarried couples. This is not to say that no cases have recog-
nized implied-in-fact contracts or resulting trusts in the arrange-
ments of cohabitants. But decisions which do so rest on fairly firm 
proof of intentions.9 Absent such proof, then, one cannot confi-
dently assume that a court will infer an agreement concerning 
property from a couple's conduct until the courts have recognized 
9. See, e.g., McMillan v. Massie's Exr., 233 Ky. 808, 27 S.W.2d 416 (1930); Orth v. 
Wood, 354 Pa. 121, 47 A.2d 140 (1946); Worsche v. Kraning, 353 Pa. 481, 46 A.2d 220 
(1946); Poole v. Schicte, 39 Wash. 2d 961, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951); and two cases decided 
after Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (for a 
discussion of the significance of Marvin, see text at notes 10-20, infra): Carlson v. Olson, 
- Minn.-, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977); and Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 
(1978). 
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as standard some general features of the relationship of unmar-
ried cohabitants. 
Marvin v. Marvin,1° the widely publicized decision of the 
California Supreme Court (and perhaps the recent court decision 
Dear Abby referred to), suggested one presumption that might 
become such a standard feature: that cohabitants intend to deal 
fairly with each other. That may sound truistic, but its implica-
tions not only could make proving implied-in-fact agreements 
easier, but also could significantly influence the development of 
restitutionary remedies. 
Some periodicals reported the Marvin case as more revolu-
tionary than it really was. 11 The actual holding rested upon the 
plaintiff's allegation of an express contract. The Marvin court 
merely held that an agreement made during cohabitation to 
"'combine their efforts and earnings and ... share equally any 
and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether 
individual or combined' " was enforceable.12 Thus, Marvin clearly 
rejected the view that such contracts are unenforceable, but it 
was hardly the first case to do so.13 The majority opinion did say, 
however, that an unmarried cohabitant might also recover on 
theories of implied contract, implied partnership or joint venture, 
constructive trust, resulting trust, or, under some circumstances, 
quantum meruit; it did permit the pl_aintiff to add such claims 
on remand if the facts warranted. 14 The far-reaching implications 
that some have seen in the Marvin case lie mainly in that dic-
tum.15 
Nor is the Marvin opinion revolutionary if it meant by these 
suggestions that courts should enforce cohabitants' agreements, 
whether express or implied-in-fact from the parties' conduct. 
Other cases in other jurisdictions have taken similar positions. 18 
But the opinion's tenor strongly suggests that the court was not 
thinking only of remedies reeiting on actual contract or trust, ex-
press or implied-in-fact; the court also contemplated remedies 
10. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). The Index to Legal 
Periodicals shows that to date the Marvin case has been the subject of notes, comments, 
or articles in over fifteen different law reviews. 
11. See, e.g., 'l'IME, Jan. 10, 1977, at 39 ("[t]he landmark decision •.. states that 
cohabitation without marriage gives both parties the right to share property if they sepa-
rate"); Kay & Amyx, supra note 7, at 954 n.104. 
12. 18 Cal. 3d at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (quoting the plaintifrs 
complaint). 
13. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 107-08 and cases cited therein. 
14. 18 Cal. 3d at 675, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. 
15. See, e.g., Kay & Amyx, supra note 7; 90 HARv. L. REv. 1708 (1977). 
16. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 107-08 and cases cited therein. 
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implied-in-law where there had been no actual agreement. The 
opinion indicated that courts ought to recognize certain basic 
propositions concerning the relationship of unmarried couples 
and that "judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy 
based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the 
parties to a nonmarital relationship should be removed."17 It was 
in reference to the expectations courts might have about most 
cohabitational relationships that the majority endorsed the pre-
sumption that cohabitants intend "to deal fairly with each 
other."18 The majority suggested that courts begin fashioning a 
law of remedies appropriate to nonmarital relationships, just as 
the courts had devised doctrines to deal with "putative" spouses 
before legislation19 recognized such persons' rights. Significantly, 
the route the California courts took in constructing putative-
spouse remedies traversed the field of unjust enrichment; the 
remedies were, for the most part, restitutionary. 20 
If judicially created remedies are made available to unmar-
ried couples in the absence of an agreement, restitution and un-
just enrichment principles will probably be the medium. The 
plight of a spurned cohabitant who dutifully stayed home and 
kept house while the other cohabitant ventured out and acquired 
wealth resembles other situations in which unjust enrichment has 
been recognized. However, it also differs significantly, and we 
must now ask whether those differences should bar some form of 
restitution where no agreement allocates property rights between 
the cohabitants. 
The law of restitution concerns transfers of economic value 
from one party to another party who cannot justifiably retain the 
net benefit. The courts have developed several remedies in 
common-law and equitable actions to effectuate restitution.21 If 
the plaintiff transferred to the defendant specific real, personal, 
or intangible property, the plaintiff may recover it in specie if the 
17. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 657 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. 
18. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 657 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (paraphrasing J. Peters' 
dissent in Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 674, 371 P.2d 329, 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 603 
(1962)). 
19. 18 Cal. 3d at 677, 557 P.2d at 118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 827. 
20. See Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Coats v. Coats, 160 
Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911) (the theory of recovery in the preceding two cases is predicated 
on the idea that property held in the man's name was in part the product of the woman's 
contribution, and it would therefore be unjust to allow him to retain all); Sanguinetti v. 
Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937) (quasi-contract); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 
88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948) (quasi-contract). See generally 4 G. PALMER, LAW 
OF fu:sTlTUTION § 18.3 (1978). 
21. See generally D. DoBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 4.4 (1973). 
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defendant cannot justify his retention of it. The plaintiff may 
resort to the familiar common-law remedies of replevin and eject-
ment (or their statutory counterparts) for this purpose. If the 
plaintiff cannot recover the object in specie, or perhaps even if he 
can, he may alternatively recover a money judgment for its value, 
or for the proceeds of its sale, through the common counts of 
"money had and received," "goods sold and delivered," or the 
like. If the defendant has transferred the object and used the 
proceeds to acquire another asset, the plaintiff may in some cir-
cumstances claim the substitute asset in specie, an interest in it, 
or its proceeds, through equitable principles of "tracing" and the 
remedies of constructive trust, equitable lien, or accounting. The 
plaintiff may also be able to recover the value of the use of his 
property by the defendant. 
If the defendant obtained value from the plaintiff in the form 
of services, restitution in specie, of course, is not possible. The 
plaintiff may, however, recover the reasonable value of his ser-
vices through the common count of work and labor performed 
(quantum meruit). Services, too, may sometimes be traced into 
a specific asset, in which case the plaintiff's restitution may take 
the form of an interest in that asset or an accounting for its 
proceeds. 
The decisions in cases granting or withholding these reme-
dies may be couched in terms of contract or trust: a contract may 
be "implied-in-law" or a constructive trust may "arise." But in 
modern analysis, such terms really mean that the court has found 
a remediable unjust enrichment. In short, if a court allows resti-
tution, it does so because the defendant has received a cognizable 
benefit; the benefit was at the plaintiff's expense; and the defen-
dant's retention of it was unjustified. The modern law of restitu-
tion is, in the main, the elaboration of these three fundamental 
elements.22 
In examining the first of these three elements-"benefit" -in 
the relations of unmarried couples, we must assume that it can-
not include sexual companionship. The courts have uniformly 
held that sexual services cannot supply the consideration for even 
an express contract.23 Certainly, then, courts will not treat sexual 
services as the benefit in an unjust enrichment claim. Household 
services, however, are economically valuable, and despite the dif-
22. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 20, §§ 1.7-.8. 
23. Some courts have reasoned that such a contract, no matter how described, is 
essentially one of prostitution. See, e.g., Naimo v. LaFianza, 146 N.J. Super. 362, 370-72, 
369 A.2d 987, 991-93 (Ch. Div. 1976). 
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ficulty of precisely assessing that value, its transfer can certainly 
supply the benefit.24 
As to the second element, the plaintiff in a cohabitation case 
may have trouble establishing that the benefit was supplied at his 
expense or detriment. If the services were only what the plaintiff 
wouid have done had he not lived with the defendant, one might 
argue that the defendant did not acquire the benefit at the plain-
tiffs expense, since the plaintiff received full value in the form 
of the benefits he himself received. However, it normally is more 
burdensome to keep house for two than for one, and so, in most 
cases where the plaintiffs role in the relationship was to keep 
house, the plaintiff can probably show a real expenditure of ser-
vices for the defendant's benefit. If the value of those beneficial 
services exceeds the value of the benefits received from the defen-
dant-in goods or services-a court may appropriately allow the 
plaintiff to recover for the defendant's net benefit. 
The most troublesome problem in applying restitution prin-
ciples to the situation of unmarried couples lies in the third-
"unjustness"-element. Not all uncompensated benefits are 
unjust enrichment. If one confers a benefit with donative in-
tent, the recipient's retention ~f it cannot, of course, be called 
unjustified. Basically, our law deems an enrichment unjust if 
neither the terms of a valid contract or other legal transaction, 
nor any overriding social policy, can explain its retention.25 
In most restitution cases, the defendant has acquired his 
benefit tortiously,26 in breach of contract, 'J:l through a contract or 
gift which subsequently was rescinded, 28 under an unenforceable 
contract (e.g., because.of the plaintiffs breach or the Statute of 
Frauds),29 or through certain mistakes by the plaintiff (such as 
paying the defendant a debt not owed or a debt owed to a third 
24. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 110-14; Havighurst, Services in the Home, 41 YALE 
L.J. 386, 398-99 (1932). 
25. J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 127-28 (1951). 
26. Restitution has been recognized as an alternative remedy for some torts since the 
concept of "waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit" was recognized in the early English 
case of Lamine v. Dorell, 2 Ld. Raym. 1216, 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (K.B. 1705). See generally 
1 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch. 2. 
27. See Comment, ~estitution-Availability as anAltemative Remedy Where Plain• 
tiff Has Fully Performed a Contract To Provide Goods or Services, 57 MICH. L. REv. 268 
(1958). See generally 1 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch. 4. 
28. A contract may be rescinded for such causes as misrepresentation, mistake, du-
ress, fundamental breach, or incapacity of one of the parties. See D. DOBBS, supra note 
21, at 254-56. Restitution in cases involving inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers is 
throughly covered in 4 G. PALMER, supra note 20, chs. 18-20. 
29. See generally 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch.6. 
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party).30 Sometimes the plaintiff can recover a benefit which 
should have gone to him but which the defendant acquired from 
a third party.31 In some situations the plaintiff may even recover 
for benefits he voluntarily conferred upon the defendant without 
the latter's request.32 
Most of these common kinds of cases clearly manifest the 
facts that tend to make the defendant's retention of benefits un-
just. If in acquiring the benefit the defendant acted in a way the 
law independently characterizes as wrongful (e.g., tortiously or in 
breach of contract of fiduciary duty), the unjustness is easily 
established. The unjustness of a benefit conferred in part per-
formance of a validly rescinded contract or gift is also readily 
apparent. The law requires the parties to restore the status quo 
ante, and so the defendant cannot justify retaining the benefit. 
By drawing from these common restitution cases analogies to 
claims for services rendered to a cohabitant, we should in some 
situations easily find indicia of unjustness. If, for instance, the 
defendant induced the plaintiff to enter the relationship-or to 
remain in it-by a broken promise (e.g., of marriage), by a mis-
representation of material facts (e.g., present marital status), or 
by duress, then the defendant could not justly retain benefits 
obtained through that actively wrongful conduct.33 If, for another 
instance, the defendant did not knowingly misrepresent material 
facts, but a mistaken belief regarding such facts induced the 
plaintiff to enter the relationship, the enrichment of the defen-
dant by the plaintiff's services can still be called unjust without 
departing far from analogous precedents relating to the rescission 
of mistaken gifts. A unilateral mistake on the donor's part will 
usually warrant a rescission if the donor would not otherwise have 
made the gift.34 Upon rescission, the donee's retention of the gift 
becomes unjustifiable, and if the gift was of services, the donee 
can be required to pay a reasonable value. That approach to the 
question of unjustness underlies the cases allowing one putative 
spouse to recover from another or from his estate upon discover-
ing the invalidity of the marriage.35 
However, we are considering couples who know they are not 
30. See 3 id. § 14.8. 
31. See 4 id. § 21.5. 
32. See 2 id. ch. 10. 
33. See, e.g., Marsh v. Marsh, 79 Cal. App. 560, 250 P. 411 (1926); Mbcer v. Mixer, 2 
Cal. App. 227, 83 P. 273 (1905); Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497 (1845); Saunders v. Ragan, 
172 N.C. 612, 90 S.E. 777 (1916); In re Fox's Estate, 178 Wis. 369, 190 N.W. 90 (1922). 
34. See 4 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 18.2, at 8. 
35. Id. § 18.3. 
November 1978) Unmarried Couples 55 
married and whose mistake differs from that in the putative-
marriage cases. Moreover, in a putative marriage, there will be 
additional indicia of unjustness. Either the putative husband will 
have known the wife's mistake and have taken advantage of it, 
or he will have thought himself validly married and accordingly 
will have expected to incur financial obligations from the rela-
tionship. Either possibility more clearly evinces the unjustness of 
an uncompensated retention (or an accrual to the estate) of the 
cohabitant's beneficial services than does the situation of a cou-
ple who knew they were not married. A comparable fundamental 
mistake may have induced the plaintiff to enter a nonmarital 
relationship, but the defendant, unlike the putative husband, 
may have had no reason to anticipate financial obligations. Nev-
ertheless, the donee of any voidable gift who cannot return the 
gift in specie and who must therefore return its value may simi-
larly have anticipated no obligations. 36 Analogous precedent, 
then, supports the conclusion that retaining the benefit of ser-
vices may be unjust if one cohabitant performed them for the 
other because of a fundamental mistake. , 
However, the typical modem cohabitation probably more 
closely resembles the relationship envisioned in the letter to Dear 
Abby. The parties cohabit fully aware of the relevant facts, and 
the indicia of unjustness found in the fraud, duress, and mistake 
circumstances are therefore absent. Even if the parties did not . 
actually agree about the transfer of benefits from one to the other, 
they probably contemplated that the benefits they would re-
ceive-material and non-material-would offset the burdens they 
undertook. Neither party anticipated paying for the material 
benefits received from the other except by contributing to the 
relationship. Each party understood that the material benefit 
received would depend upon what the other chose to contribute. 
Under those assumptions, neither party's contributions could 
unjustly enrich the other .. Fully aware, they chose not to under-
take the obligations of formal marriage, thus foregoing the legal 
rights of marriage as well. They chose not to specify their mutual 
rights and obligations in an actual contract or a partnership or 
36. The court in Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N.Y. 432, 44 N.E. 163, 27 N.Y.S. 616 (1896), 
in denying restitution to the donor, expressed concern that the recipient of a mistaken gift 
might have already spent the money and might therefore find it a hardship if ordered to 
repay. This concern, however, seems more appropriately analyzed as a ground for avoid-
ance of liability rather than as indicating the absence of "unjustness" in the enrichment. 
Cf. 4 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 18.2, at 9 (the possible prejudice to the donee of a 
voidable giR who must make restitution necessitates that clear proof be given that the 
gift resulted from a mistake, but does not invalidate mistake as a ground for rescission). 
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trust agreement. If one party becomes dissatisfied with the ar-
rangement or feels that he is giving more than receiving, the 
remedy is to give less, or simply to stop giving-to end the rela-
tionship. 
That solution is not always easy, however. When one party 
works in the marketplace and the other in the home, they may 
not be free-or equally free-to end their association. Breaking 
off the relationship normally would not seriously harm the bread-
winner economically, but the one who keeps house could lose all 
economic support. That might well deter him from ending, or 
even jeopardizing, the association, even if he considers the sup-
port he receives disproportionate to his contribution. But without 
a contract or unconscionable conduct by the other party, how 
could he, when the relationship ends, call the other's enrichment 
unjust? 
The Marvin court apparently felt that the presumption "that 
the parties intend to deal fairly with each other"37 answers that 
question. That presumption implies that if, as the relationship 
develops, one party regularly receives economic benefits dispro-
portionate to his contributions, the imbalance will somehow be 
corrected. At some point in such a situation, the person keeping 
house may abandon his essentially donative motivation and ex-
pect some tangible recompense for continuing to perform benefi-
cial services. If the imbalance is substantial, the other party 
should realize that the one at home serves with that expectation 
even if the couple never actually agreed to it. As to indicia of 
unjustness, the cohabitants' situation at that point begins to re-
semble some unsolicited-benefit situations in which the plaintiff, 
without a donative intent and without any request from the de-
fendant, knowingly confers a benefit on the latter. 
In unsolicited-benefit cases, unjustness is most elusive, for 
while the defendant will have received a windfall at the plaintiff's 
expense, that alone does not make the retention of the benefit 
unjustified when the plaintiff knowingly and intentionally made 
the transfer. Anglo-American courts have resisted obligating a 
defendant to pay someone he did not deal with-and may not 
have wanted to deal with-for something he did not order, may 
not have wanted, and perhaps could not afford. 38 The courts have 
37. See 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (paraphrasing J. 
Peters' dissent in Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 674, 371 P.2d 329, 339, 21 Cal. Rptr., 
593, 603 (1962)). 
38. See generally 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch. 10; Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: 
The Altruistic Intermeddler (pts. 1-2), 74 HARV. L. REV. 817, 1073 (1961); Hope, 
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not regarded sympathetically a plaintiffs voluntary intrusion 
into the defendant's affairs, even when an altruistic concern for 
the defendant's welfare motivated the plaintiff. Only where the 
reason the plaintiff bestowed the benefit warrants interfering 
with the defendant's autonomy will the courts consider the en-
richment unjust and grant restitution. In analyzing unjustness, 
then, courts inspect the plaintiffs motivation and the extent to 
which restitution would infringe the defendant's freedom of 
choice.39 
If the defendant can reject an unsolicited benefit without 
harming himself, his accepting and keeping it without paying for 
it may be unjustified even if he did not request it. 40 Whether a 
court will find his retention unjust turns on the plaintiff's motiva-
tion and the defendant's understanding of that motivation. If the 
plaintiff intended a gift, of course, the defendant incurs no obliga-
tion by accepting the benefit. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff 
intended that the defendant pay for the value transferred, and 
the defendant knew that when he accepted the benefit, the defen-
dant normally cannot justify appropriating it to his beneficial use 
without paying anything.41 If the defendant did not understand 
that the plaintiff expected payment, courts must take other facts 
into account. Those facts would include the reason the plaintiff 
acted as he did and the prejudice to the defendant that restitu-
tion would entail. If the plaintiff acted officiously, recovery is 
unlikely;42 if he acted to protect his own interests, recovery may 
be permitted. A junior lienor who pays a defendant's debt to a 
senior lienor to preserve property from loss, for instance, usually 
can claim restitution in the form of subrogation. 43 In such a case, 
the law can hardly disparage the junior lienor's motive, and al-
lowing him restitution imposes no new burden ·on the defendant. 
Although the defendant may have had no chance to refuse the 
benefit, he cannot justify retaining it at the plaintiffs expense. 
The benefit •in the cohabitants' situation, of course, often 
consists of services, and the defendant may be unable to refuse 
the benefit once the service has been rendered. And it is true that 
Officiousness (pts. 1-2), 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 205 (1929-1930); Wade, Restitution for Bene-
fits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1183 (1966). 
39. See D. DOBBS, supra note 21, § 4.9. 
40. 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 10.10. 
41. A federal statute, 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1976), specifically permits the recipient of 
unordered merchandise received through the mail to use it without obligation. 
42. See the sources cited in note 38 supra. In particular, see Hope, at 27-29; Wade, 
at 1184. 
43. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 10.5(a). 
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courts are less likely to regard a retention of the benefit as unjust 
in such cases than where the defendant had a choice. 44 But where 
the defendant would inevitably have purchased the same service 
anyway, requiring the defendant to pay for it simply obligates 
him to pay the plaintiff an unavoidable expense. That situation 
resembles the case of the junior lienor. Such an obligation may 
interfere with the defendant's autonomy relatively slightly. 
These principles might resolve the problem of unequal con-
tributions in a modern cohabitation. Economic necessity does not 
inhibit the marketplace laborer, as it does the party who works 
at home, from leaving a relationship. Thus, by remaining in the 
relationship and continuing to accept its material benefits, the 
marketplace laborer can be said to have implicitly agreed to com-
pensate the other or can be called unjustly enriched if he does not. 
Even if the worker outside the home does not understand (as he 
should) that the worker in the home expects more than he has 
received, to the extent that the latter provides services which 
satisfy basic human needs-food, clothing, shelter-the former 
receives benefits that he himself would otherwise have to provide. 
Requiring him to make restitution, therefore, would not force him 
to pay for something he did not want and would not have pro-
cured from some source. 
Requiring the marketplace laborer to make restitution for his 
cohabitant's services, however, would force him to buy something 
he might have supplied himself or been given by another source. 
By analogy to unsolicited benefits, that he incurs an obligation 
to pay without a choice among alternatives weakens the claim 
that he has been unjustly enriched, for the plaintiff in an 
unsolicited-benefit case generally may not recover if he could 
have allowed the defendant to choose someone else to supply the 
service.45 For example, while a physician who, unrequested, ren-
ders necessary medical aid in an emergency may recover the rea-
sonable value of his services, 45 he may not recover if no emergency 
prevented him from securing the defendant's consent. 
However, that analogy should not be pressed too far. By 
hypothesis, the home worker does not volunteer services gratui-
tously, and the other party receives nothing he did not seek. The 
beneficiary resembles the recipient of an unsolicited benefit. He 
may not have actually understood that his benefactor expected 
payment, but if the presumption of the expectation of fair dealing 
44. See id. § 10.lO(b), at 461. 
45. See fu:sTATEMENT OF REsTITIJTION § 113, Comment f (1937). 
46. See id. § 116; Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953), 
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is valid, he should have realized he would incur some obligation 
should the mutual contributions fall into serious disequilibrium. 
Being relatively freer to terminate the association, he does have 
a choice of sorts. Thus, requiring restitution may be appropriate. 
In the abstract, this analysis seems sensible if we ascribe to 
the cohabitants the expectation of "fair dealing" (and forget that 
that ascription may be fictitious). In reality, however, we merely 
substitute one vague conception (fair dealing) for another (unjust 
enrichment). We need indicia of "fairness" to determine when 
the contributions fall out of balance and what the defendant's 
resulting obligation should be. When the cohabitation arrange-
ment contemplates from its inception that each party's contribu-
tion, rather than money or other objectively definable value, will 
supply the quid pro quo for the other party's contribution, no easy 
formula can indicate when the contributions are too unequal to 
be "fair." Analogies drawn from common restitution cases, there-
fore, probably cannot identify an unjust enrichment except where 
that disparity is extreme. But, in any event, perhaps that is the 
only situation in which the courts ought to involve themselves. 
When extreme disparity occurs, however, some form of resti-
tution should be available. If the plaintiff seeks a money judg-
ment in quantum meruit, placing a dollar value on the parties' 
contributions will be difficult. One court has held that a jury can 
fix the value by drawing upon its general knowledge of the worth 
of such things.47 Relying upon the jury's sense of reasonableness 
may be appropriate in a suit for damages from pain and suffering, 
which lack objective criteria entirely, but such reliance is ques-
tionable where the action seeks monetary recovery for an eco-
nomic benefit. Tµere is a market for household services, 48 and 
market value should basically determine the amount of enrich-
ment. Admittedly, services lovingly·performed by a resident 
housekeeper are probably more desirable than those of a domestic 
servant, but such subjective values have never been weighed in 
restitutionary recovery. 
Unmarried cohabitants seem to seek money awards for their 
services less frequently than they claim a share of the defendant's 
property. The cases that allow relief in the form of property to one 
who contributed primarily household services usually do so pur-
suant to an express or implied-in-fact agreement (including a 
47. Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Natl. Bank, 243 P.2d 561, 567-68 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.1952) 
(allowed only for express contract). 
48. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 110-14; see generally Havighurst, supra note 24. 
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resulting trust).0 A few cases, however, have indicated that in the 
absence of an agreement, such a remedy may be predicated on 
unjust enrichment principles.50 Traditionally, restitution in the 
form of an interest in specific property for benefits conferred in a 
different form has depended upon the plaintiff's ability to trace 
the benefit actually conferred through successive transformations 
directly into the specific asset sought. Gl One can trace a benefit 
in the form of money,· for instance, into a bank account, from 
there into corporate stock purchased from the account, and from 
there into real estate for which the stock was exchanged. Tracing 
is obviously more difficult when the benefit consists of services 
rendered not to the specific property, but to the defendant per-
sonally. Arguably, the plaintiff's beneficial services permitted 
the defendant to expend on the specific property some funds or 
energies he otherwise would have spent for the services, and thus 
the plaintiff may trace the services to the property. The law of 
restitution does not permit this sort of indirect tracing in other 
situations, however. 
A si:nnlar argument in favor of tracing-and involving simi-
larly indirect tracing-suggests that the beneficial household 
services enhance the economic worth of the defendant himself 
and thus contribute to the defendant's every economic decision, 
including his purchases of property. The services could even be 
said to contribute to the defendant's present and future earning 
capacity and thus to justify a constructive trust against not only 
presently held property, but future income as well.52 This ratio-
nale essentially duplicates that of the law directing the division 
of property acquired during marriage when formally married cou-
ples divorce. 
Whether the same analysis should apply to both married and 
unmarried couples is questionable. In an actual marriage, spouses 
exchange not only economic but subjective spiritual and emo-
tional values as well. Marriage implies equal sharing of burdens 
and benefits, and the courts and legislatures recognize that. The 
courts have extended that implication to the situation of putative 
spouses who live together for an extended period mistakenly be-
lieving they are actually married, an appropriate extension in 
49. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1953). 
60. See Hager v. Hager, 553 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1976); Carlson v. Olson,_ Minn. 
-, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974). 
51. See RF.sTATEMENT OF RFsrmmoN § 160, Comment i (1937). 
52. A similar suggestion is made in Kay & Amyx, supra note 7, at 964-65 (wife who 
put husband through school has a constructive trust in the educational capital of her 
graduated husband). 
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view of the parties' expectations.53 The rights of knowingly un-
married couples, on the other hand, must, unless a new status is 
recognized, spring from legal sources other than the law of mar-
riage: basic principles of tort, contract, trust, property, and un-
just enrichment. To allow the subjective, indirect tracing that the 
rationale behind property division upon divorce entails would go 
far beyond what cases permit where unjust enrichment is the 
defendant's sole source of obligation. Courts could ignore tracing 
and instead candidly recognize a "quasi-marriage" or "quasi-
community-property" relationship that enables one who contrib-
uted services to claim a share of property, but that would depart 
even further from established principles of restitution and unjust 
enrichment. To allow a knowingly unmarried party, iri the name 
of unjust enrichment, the same right allowed a real or putative 
spouse to claim property acquired by the other (in the absence of 
an express or implied-in-fact agreement) is to recognize the new 
"common law status" Dear Abby referred to. 
The potential effect of such a status on the institution of 
monogamous marriage, and on the society which has heretofore 
believed that institution fundamental, is a profoundly significant 
issue. Its implications transcend the interests of particular parties 
and outstrip the ability of a lawsuit-where the adversaries frame 
the issues and supply the evidence-to consider them adequately. 
The legislative process is much better equipped to resolve such 
questions, although it too is seriously handicapped when dealing 
with issues as emotional and symbolic as the future of marriage. 
That some courts have been persuaded to assist a person who 
worked at home to recover a share of his cohabitant's property 
after a stable, long-term, knowingly unmarried relationship 
strongly suggests that some new legal status ought to be recog-
nized. At least one state legislature has recognized an unmarried 
cohabitant's claim to a share of the partner's property upon the 
partner's death.54 fu view of the growing numbers who choose to 
live together unmarried, other states' legislatures cannot long ig-
nore the need to resolve property claims that arise when such 
relationships terminate. fu the meantime, the unmarried cohabi-
tants are well-advised to provide privately, by agreement, their 
own solutions. fu the absence of such agreements, unjust enrich-
ment principles may be resorted to in some cases. The plaintiff 
53. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335. 191 P. 533 (1920); Werner v. 
Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 P. 127 (1898). See generally Evans, Property Interests Arising 
from Quasi-Marital Relations, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 246, 254-61 (1924). 
54. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1968). 
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whose economic contribution to the relationship was primarily of 
household services may find it hard to establish unjust enrich-
ment, but not impossible if the Marvin court's presumption of an 
expectation of fair dealing is accepted. Where the relationship 
lasted a long time, where the plaintiff contributed services the 
defendant would otherwise have had to provide for himself, where 
the economic value the- plaintiff gave and received differed 
greatly, and where the plaintiff's economic dependence inhibited 
his freedom to end the relationship, the defendant's enrichment 
can be considered unjustified. 
A money recovery in the amount by which the value of the 
plaintiff's services exceeded the support and other economic 
value the plaintiff received may be appropriate in such cases and 
would not depart widely from precedents in analogous cases. Res-
titution in the form of a share of property is another matter. 
Allowing such a remedy where household services were the bene-
fit would strain established notions of tracing. If that remedy is 
recognized, it should be und~rstood as a feature of a new status, 
not as a product of the general law of restitution.55 And if that 
status is to be recognized, the legislatures, not the courts should 
do so.56 
55. Washington cases seem to recognize that, even absent legislation, community 
property rights can be acquired through a stable, long-term meretricious relationship. See 
In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (dicta); 53 WASH. L. REV. 
145, 168-69 (1977). 
56. Postscript: On April 17, 1979, the California Supreme Court announced its deci-
sion in Marvin v. Marvin. It found no contract-express or implied; it found no 
trust-actual, constructive, or resulting; nevertheless, it awarded the plaintiff $104,000 
"for rehabilitation purposes, so that she may have the economic means to educate herself 
and to learn new, employable skills • . . and so that she may return from her status as 
companion of a motion picture star to a separate but perhaps more prosaic existence." 
Los Angeles Daily Journal, April 19, 1979, at 10. The only justification offered by the court 
was a reference to footnote 25 of the California Supreme Court's Marvin decision, 18 Cal. 
3d at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832, which it said authorized trial courts to 
employ "whatever equitable remedy may be proper under the circumstances." 
It is impossible to contemplate a remedy, equitable or otherwise, apart from a right. 
One may thus wonder where the substantive right to "rehabilitation" came from. The 
findings of the court exclude the possibility that the right stemmed from unjust enrich-
ment or from a contract to share in the defendant's earnings. No express finding was 
made, however, relating to a contract for the rehabilitation of the plaintiff at the termina-
tion of the relationship. Perhaps the court found an implied contract deriving from the 
"exp'ectation of fair dealing" recognized by the California Supreme Court. See text at note 
37 supra. If so, it would have been helpful if the court had made that clear. 
